Threat for the Secure Remote Password Protocol and a Leak in Apple’s Cryptographic Library

Andy Russon (1, 2)

1 IRMAR - Institut de Recherche Mathématique de Rennes
2 Orange Labs [Cesson-Sévigné]

The Secure Remote Password protocol is a password-based authenticated key-exchange between two parties. One advantage is to prevent offline dictionary attacks from an adversary eavesdropping the communication. We present how such an attack is feasible if the modular exponentiation at the heart of the protocol is vulnerable and leaks some data related to the password. In the case of a fixed exponent, adding randomness during the execution is a classical protection mechanism, and such a mechanism is present in Apple’s cryptographic library to randomize the exponent. Despite being intended to protect against complex side-channel attacks, we show that its usage makes the implementation vulnerable to simple side-channels such as power analysis. This leakage observed in the library is mild but is useful for the attack we propose on the Secure Remote Password protocol.

Mots clés: Apple; Dictionary attack; Euclidean splitting; Exponentiation; Secure Remote Password

Domaines: Cryptographie et sécurité [cs.CR]

Andy Russon. Threat for the Secure Remote Password Protocol and a Leak in Apple’s Cryptographic Library. Kazue Sako; Nils Ole Tippenhauer. Applied Cryptography and Network Security, 12727, Springer International Publishing, pp.49-75, 2021, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 978-3-030-78374-7. ⟨10.1007/978-3-030-78375-4_3⟩. ⟨hal-03377105⟩