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Journal Articles Studia Philosophica Estonica Year : 2013

Why a Gunk World is Compatible with Nihilism about Objects

Baptiste Le Bihan


Ted Sider argues that nihilism about objects is incompatible with the metaphysical possibility of gunk and takes this point to show that nihilism is flawed. I shall describe one kind of nihilism able to answer this objection. I believe that most of the things we usually encounter do not exist. That is, I take talk of macroscopic objects and macroscopic properties to refer to sets of fundamental properties, which are invoked as a matter of linguistic convention. This view is a kind of nihilism: it rules out the existence of objects; that is, from an ontological point of view, there are no objects. But unlike the moderate nihilism of Mark Heller, Peter van Inwagen and Trenton Merricks that claims that most objects do not exist, I endorse a radical nihilism according to which there are no objects in the world, but only properties instantiated in spacetime. As I will show, radical nihilism is perfectly compatible with the metaphysical possibility of gunk. It is also compatible with the epistemic possibility that we actually live in a gunk world. The objection raised by Ted Sider only applies to moderate nihilism that admits some objects in its ontology.
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hal-00960005 , version 1 (17-03-2014)



Baptiste Le Bihan. Why a Gunk World is Compatible with Nihilism about Objects. Studia Philosophica Estonica, 2013, 6.1, pp.1-14. ⟨10.12697/spe.2013.6.1.01⟩. ⟨hal-00960005⟩
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