No-futurism and Metaphysical Contingentism

Abstract : According to no-futurism, past and present entities are real, but future ones are not. This view faces a skeptical challenge (Bourne 2002, 2006, Braddon-Mitchell, 2004): if no-futurism is true, how do you know you are present? I shall propose a new skeptical argument based on the physical possibility of Gödelian worlds (1949). This argument shows that a no-futurist has to endorse a metaphysical contingentist reading of no-futurism, the view that no-futurism is contingently true. But then, the no-futurist has to face a new skeptical challenge: how do you know that you are in a no-futurist world?
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Baptiste Le Bihan. No-futurism and Metaphysical Contingentism. Axiomathes, Springer Verlag, 2014, 24 (4), pp.483-497. ⟨10.1007/s10516-014-9236-9⟩. ⟨hal-00997544⟩

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