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Article Dans Une Revue Theoretical Computer Science Année : 2014

Quantifying Information Leakage of Randomized Protocols

Résumé

The quantification of information leakage provides a quantitative evaluation of the security of a system. We propose the usage of Markovian processes to model deterministic and probabilistic systems. By using a methodology generalizing the lattice of information approach we model refined attackers capable to observe the internal behavior of the system, and quantify the information leakage of such systems. We also use our method to obtain an algorithm for the computation of channel capacity from our Markovian models. Finally, we show how to use the method to analyze timed and non-timed attacks on the Onion Routing protocol.
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Dates et versions

hal-01088193 , version 1 (27-11-2014)

Identifiants

Citer

Fabrizio Biondi, Axel Legay, Pasquale Malacaria, Andrzej Wąsowski. Quantifying Information Leakage of Randomized Protocols. Theoretical Computer Science, 2014, pp.68 - 87. ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-35873-9_7⟩. ⟨hal-01088193⟩
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