On lookahead equilibria in congestion games

Vittorio Bilò (1) , Angelo Fanelli (2) , Luca Moscardelli (3)

1 Dipartimento di Matematica Ennio De Giorgi
2 CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management
3 Dipartimento di Scienze - Universita di Chieti-Pescara

We investigate the issues of existence and efficiency of lookahead equilibria in congestion games. Lookahead equilibria, whose study has been initiated by Mirrokni et al. [10], correspond to the natural extension of pure Nash equilibria in which the players, when making use of global information in order to predict subsequent reactions of the other ones, have computationally limited capabilities.

Mots clés: congestion games

Domaines: Economies et finances; Complexité [cs.CC]; Intelligence artificielle [cs.AI]

Vittorio Bilò, Angelo Fanelli, Luca Moscardelli. On lookahead equilibria in congestion games. Yiling Chen; Nicole Immorlica. Web and Internet Economics, 8289, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp.54-67, 2013, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 978-3-642-45045-7. ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_6⟩. ⟨hal-01104063⟩