Road-Side Units Operators in Competition: a Game-Theoretical Approach

Vladimir Fux (1, 2) , Patrick Maillé (1, 2) , Matteo Cesana (3)

1 OCIF - Objets communicants pour l'Internet du futur
2 RSM - Département Réseaux, Sécurité et Multimédia
3 DEIB - Dipartimento di Elettronica, Informazione e Bioingegneria

We study the interactions among Internet providers in vehicular networks which offer access to commuters via road side units (RSUs). Namely, we propose a game-theoretical framework to model the competition on prices between vehicular Internet providers to capture the largest amount of users, thus selfishly maximizing the revenues. The equilibria of the aforementioned game are characterized under different mobile traffic conditions, RSU capabilities and users requirements and expectations. In particular, we also consider in the analysis the case where mobile users modify the price they accept to pay for the access as the likeliness of finding an access solution decreases. Our game-theoretical analysis gives insights on the outcomes of the competition between vehicular Internet providers, further highlighting some counter-intuitive behaviors; as an example, comparing with the case when users have constant price valuation over time, having users inclined to increasing their "acceptable" price may force vehicle Internet providers to charge lower prices due to competition.

Mots clés: Game theory; Competition; Pricing; Vehicular networks

Domaines: Réseaux et télécommunications [cs.NI]

Vladimir Fux, Patrick Maillé, Matteo Cesana. Road-Side Units Operators in Competition: a Game-Theoretical Approach. Computer Networks, 2015, 88, pp.103 - 120. ⟨10.1016/j.comnet.2015.06.008⟩. ⟨hal-01185712⟩