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*. , C. Tappolet, and C. Todd,

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, For views along these lines, see Brentano, Tappolet (2000), D'Arms and Jacobson, 1969.

. Ewing, , 1939.

, Chisholm (1986) proposed the plausibly very close if not identical notion of "requirement

S. Rabinowicz and . Ronnow-rasmussen, In fact, the problem was first raised by D'Arms and Jacobson (2000), who call it the "conflation problem, p.38, 2004.

, For simplicity, I will avoid systematically stating this disjunction and will express myself as if fittingness can always be expressed in terms of reasons. In any case, this is not a presupposition of the paper, and I will return to the disjunction when necessary, vol.6, p.66, 2000.

. Parfit, , 2001.

. Skorupski, , 2007.

. Lang, , 2009.

D. and J. , , p.20, 2009.

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I. Use, object" in the broadest sense to refer to anything to which an emotion may be a response, whether it is a state of affairs, an event, an action, or an object in the strict ontological sense

, This point is held by judgmentalists and perceptualists, but also even by those who

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D. See and J. , , 2000.

. Ibid, , p.87

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. Pettit, , 1991.

J. See-especially-d'arms, develop a point that has already received attention from Wiggins (1987) and Pettit, 1991.

, Note that this is nothing other than reason internalism applied to reason to experience emotion. The discussion that follows should therefore be recognizable to those who are familiar with the literature on the internalism versus externalism debate about reasons, vol.29, p.116, 2006.

. Ibid, , p.73

. Ibid, , p.85