On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules

Mostapha Diss (1) , Vincent Merlin (1)

1 CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management

When choosing a voting rule to make subsequent decisions, the members of a committee may wish this rule to be self-selected when it is the object of a choice among a menu of different possible voting rules. Such concepts have recently been explored in Social Choice theory, and a menu of voting rule is said to be stable if it contains at least one self-selective voting rule at each profile of preferences on voting rules. We consider in this article the menu constituted by the three well-known scoring rules {Borda, Plurality, and Antiplurality}. Under the Impartial Culture assumption, which proposes an a priori model to estimate the likelihood of the profiles, we will derive a probability for the stability of this triplet of voting rules.

Mots clés: Self-selectivity; Stability; Instability; Scoring rules; Impartial Culture assumption

Domaines: Economies et finances

Mostapha Diss, Vincent Merlin. On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules. Theory and Decision, 2010, 69, pp.289-316. ⟨10.1007/s11238-009-9187-6⟩. ⟨halshs-00443854⟩