Stable syndicates of factor owners and distribution of social output: a Shapley value approach

Fabrice Valognes (1) , Hélène Ferrer (1) , Guillermo Owen (2)

1 CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management
2 Department of Applied Mathematics [Monterey]

The purpose of this paper is to examine the incentive of a player to join a syndicate in an environment of team production and payoff distribution according to Shapley value. We consider an economy in which a single output is produced by an increasing returns to scale production function using two inputs: labor and capital. By assuming that syndicates of factor owners can form, we are interested in their stability, i.e., the willingness of the members of the syndicate to stay in the syndicate. Our analysis, based on the Shapley value, allows us to find a fair imputation of the gains of cooperation and the conditions under which syndicates are stable.

Mots clés: Shapley Value; Syndicate; Coalition formation; Increasing return to scale.; Increasing return to scale

Domaines: Economies et finances

Fabrice Valognes, Hélène Ferrer, Guillermo Owen. Stable syndicates of factor owners and distribution of social output: a Shapley value approach. Social Choice and Welfare, 2012, 39, pp.553-565. ⟨10.1007/s00355-011-0622-6⟩. ⟨halshs-00651185⟩