No-Show Paradoxes under Parliamentary Agendas

Boniface Mbih (1) , Xingyu Zhao (1)

1 CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management

It may happen that the favorite candidate of a voter loses an election if that voter votes honestly, but gets elected if the voter abstains. Such a situation is known in the social choice literature under the name of no-show paradox. This paper is devoted to the evalution of the likelihood of that phenomenon under parliamentary voting rules.

Mots clés: alpha-majority; No-Show; Parliamentary Agendas; Impartial Anonymous Culture; alpha-majority.

Domaines: Economies et finances

Boniface Mbih, Xingyu Zhao. No-Show Paradoxes under Parliamentary Agendas. Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, 2011, 101/102, pp.127-147. ⟨halshs-00656614⟩