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Chapitre D'ouvrage Année : 2012

Which voting rule minimizes the probability of the referendum paradox? Lessons from French data

Rahhal Lahrach
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Résumé

Amajor goal of democracy is to achieve equal representation of the citizens. Though equal representation can be easily achieved when all the voters directly select a president or decide on a policy through a referendum, the issue is not that simple for indirect democracy. A crucial question thus relates to the choice of the "best" two-tier voting rules. More precisely, how many mandates should be allocated to each jurisdiction (examples being electoral constituencies, local jurisdictions, regions, states, countries) in this type of system? Which quota should be used for decision? Very different answers to these questions were adopted by the various federal structures.
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Dates et versions

halshs-00658580 , version 1 (10-01-2012)

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Citer

Rahhal Lahrach, Vincent Merlin. Which voting rule minimizes the probability of the referendum paradox? Lessons from French data. Felsenthal, Dan S. - Machover, Moshé. Electoral Systems, Springer-Verlag, pp.129-150, 2012, Studies in Choice and Welfare, ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-20441-8_5⟩. ⟨halshs-00658580⟩
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