On credible coalitional deviations by prudent players

Abderrahmane Ziad (1) , Anindya Bhattacharya

1 CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management

In this paper we first explore the predictive power of the solution notion called conservative stable standard of behaviour (CSSB), introduced by Greenberg (The theory of social situations, 1990 ), in environments with farsighted players (as modelled in Xue, Econ Theory 11:603-627, 1998 ) as intuitively it is quite nice. Unfortunately, we find that CSSB has a number of undesirable properties: most importantly, it makes vacuous predictions for most natural social environments. Therefore, we introduce an intuitive refinement of this solution which we call conservative stable weak predictor. In settings of proper voting games, we explore some existence properties of this new solution and also show that it may not be unique. However, unfortunately, this refinement may also lead to non-intuitive vacuous predictions.

Mots clés: conservative stable standard of behaviour; farsighted players; natural social environments

Domaines: Economies et finances

Abderrahmane Ziad, Anindya Bhattacharya. On credible coalitional deviations by prudent players. Social Choice and Welfare, 2012, 39 (2-3), pp.537-552. ⟨10.1007/s00355-011-0647-x⟩. ⟨halshs-00687956⟩