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Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics Année : 2013

On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition

Résumé

In this article, we study the problem of Nash implementation in private good economies with single-peaked, single-plateaued, and single-dipped preferences in the presence of at least one minimally honest agent. We prove that all solutions of the problem of fair division satisfying unanimity can be implemented in Nash equilibria as long as there are at least three agents participating in the mechanism (game form). To justify this result, we provide a list of solutions which violate the condition of no-veto power.
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Dates et versions

halshs-00869873 , version 1 (04-10-2013)

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Ahmed Doghmi, Abderrahmane Ziad. On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2013, 13 (1), pp.415-428. ⟨10.1515/bejte-2012-0028⟩. ⟨halshs-00869873⟩
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