Application of methods used in the classical matching markets to the Indian marriage market

Raïssa-Juvette Samba (1) , Rhonya Adli (2)

1 UMNG - Université Marien Ngouabi [Brazzaville]
2 CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management

In most societies, the social practice of paying dowry tends to decline and sometimes to disappear. In contrast, a system of marriages negotiated between families continues to exist in India; a marriage squeeze and a real dowry inflation are observed throughout the country. This paper brings a nice application of methods used in the classical matching markets: existence of stable outcomes and a minimum equilibrium dowry, coincidence between the set of stable outcomes and the set of competitive equilibrium outcomes. We further discuss strategic questions and address issues comparative statics when a marriage squeeze yields in the Indian marriage market.

Mots clés: Matching; Dowry auction mechanism; Equilibrium stable outcome; Competitive equilibrium outcome; Population increase; Strategy-proof; Comparative statics JEL classification: C78; D78; J11; J12; D10

Domaines: Economies et finances

Raïssa-Juvette Samba, Rhonya Adli. Application of methods used in the classical matching markets to the Indian marriage market. 2015. ⟨halshs-01180569⟩